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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models
of public good provision. The models are Örst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct
experiments to study how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in these games. We test whether
subjectsí perception of ambiguity di§ers between a local opponent and a foreign one. We
Önd that an ambiguity safe strategy, is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with
the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion ináuences behaviour in games. Subjects tend to
choose contributions above (resp. below) the Nash equilibrium in the Best Shot (resp.
Weakest Link) model.
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1 Introduction
This paper reports some theoretical results on how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in the best shot
and weakest link models of public good provision. We then proceed to study experimentally
the impact of ambiguity in these models.
Public goods are goods which can be consumed by everybody. We study situations where
individuals make voluntary contributions to the provision of the public good. Due to the
collective nature of the good everybody enjoys the same amount of it, irrespective of their
own contribution. The usual assumption is that the amount of the public good available is a
function of the sum of all individual contributions. Ambiguity in the standard public goods
model has been previously studied in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) and Bailey, Eichberger, and
Kelsey (2005). These models have been tested experimentally by Di Mauro and Castro (2011).
An alternative, is the best-shot model, where production of the public good is determined by
the maximum contribution made by an individual in the community. This may be represented
as: ui (xi; xi) = max fx1; :::; xng  cxi; where xi denotes the contribution of individual i and
c denotes the marginal cost of a contribution. In this case, making a large contribution, xi
results in a large cost, cxi, but the beneÖt accrues to all members of the group. This model
may be illustrated by a medieval village that is besieged by a dragon. It is only the knight
endeavouring to slay the dragon, who bears the cost - in this case, the chance that he will be
burnt to a crisp by the dragon. However, once the dragon is slain, the beneÖts of a dragon-
free village are enjoyed equally by all the village folk! A ìwhistle-blowerî may be seen as a
modern-day dragon-slayer. He bears the burden that comes with the act of exposing corruption
or incompetence, though the beneÖt of his act accrues to the general public.
A third possibility is the weakest link model, in which provision of the public good is a func-
tion of the minimum of the individual contributions. It may be represented as: ui (xi; xi) =
min fx1; :::; xng cxi. It may be noted that making a large contribution, xi; would have a large
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cost, cxi; but does not guarantee a large payo§, since the minimum contribution made within
the group of individuals would determine the level of the public good.
This model can be illustrated by the example of a small island community that must build
sea defences to protect itself from áooding. The success in holding back the storm waters
will depend on the minimum height or strength of the di§erent sections of the dyke. As
such, it is the weakest dyke that will succumb to the storm Örst, resulting in the entire island
being áooded. Similarly, a weakest-link problem may be observed when trying to prevent the
spread of infectious diseases such as Ebola, combating the entry of illegal drugs into a country,
or controlling illegal immigrants. The weakest link model is also relevant for environmental
problems. Consider a global pollutant such as CO2 where the damage to the environment
depends on total emissions. If industries can relocate easily, then the level of pollution would
depend on the country with the weakest environmental regulation.
Our analysis shows that although both models have multiple Nash equilibria (henceforth
NE), when ambiguity is su¢ciently high, Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (henceforth EUA) is
unique. Ambiguity-aversion will cause people to choose the highest e§ort level in the Best-Shot
model and the lowest in the weakest link model. We proceed to test our results in the laboratory.
Our experimental hypothesis is that ambiguity will decrease individualsí contributions in the
weakest-link model, whereas it will increase them in the best-shot case.
Kilka and Weber (2001) conducted an experiment where they asked German subjects to
rate their competence when judging stock price changes of Deutsche Bank (Germanyís largest
banking group) and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (one of Japanís largest banks). A majority of their
subjects (51 of the 55 studied) reported that they felt less competent when judging stock price
changes of the foreign security as opposed to the domestic security.
We test whether players in games feel a similar lack of competence when dealing with foreign
opponents. If the analogy were to hold, a subject would feel more anxious when faced by a
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foreign opponent, than when he is faced by a local one. The rationale behind this hypothesis
is that he believes the local opponent has been raised in a similar sociocultural background as
himself. Thus the behaviour of a foreign opponent, about whom there is limited knowledge, is
less predictable.
We Önd that behaviour of the subjects is consistent with our hypothesis and that ambiguity
does indeed lead subjects to decrease (resp. increase) contributions in the weakest-link (resp.
best-shot) game. However, though subjects display ambiguity aversion on the whole, the level
of ambiguity does not become more pronounced when they are matched against a foreign
opponent.
Organisation of the Paper In Section 2 we describe our framework and deÖnitions. The
public goods models are analysed theoretically in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our
experimental design and the next section discusses the data we Önd. Section 6 compares our
Öndings with related literature and Section 7 provides a summary of our results together with
future avenues of research.
2 Framework and DeÖnitions
In this section we explain how we represent ambiguity in public good models. If a public good
is provided by voluntary contributions the individuals concerned are playing a non-cooperative
game. The pay-o§ of any given individual will depend on the contributions of all other indi-
viduals as well as his/her own contribution. Thus to understand the impact of ambiguity we
need a theory of ambiguity in games.
In a Nash equilibrium, players behave in a manner that is consistent with the actual be-
haviour of their opponents. Players can perfectly anticipate the actions of their opponent and
can thus choose a best response to it. If beliefs are non-additive, we need to modify the idea
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of having consistent beliefs and the ability to play a best response. We assume that players
choose pure strategies. In equilibrium, the support of a playerís beliefs must be best responses
for the opponent, given his/her beliefs.
Our notation for games is as follows. A 2-player game  = hf1; 2g ;X1; X2; u1; u2i consists
of players, i = 1; 2, Önite pure strategy sets Xi and payo§ functions ui (xi; xi) for each player.
Both players have the same strategy set, X1 = X2  N; which consists of all integers between
a lower bound x and an upper bound x:1 The notation, xi; denotes the strategy chosen by iís
opponent and the set of all strategies for iís opponent is Xi: The space of all strategy proÖles
is denoted by X: We shall adopt the convention that female pronouns (she, her etc.) denote
player 1 and male pronouns denote player 2.2
A player has a possibly ambiguous belief about what his/her opponent will do. These beliefs
are represented by capacities, which are similar to subjective probabilities except that they are
not required to be additive over disjoint events. Formally capacities are deÖned as follows.
DeÖnition 2.1 A capacity on Xi is a real-valued function i on the subsets of Xi such that
A  B ) i (A) 6 i (B) and i (?) = 0; i (Xi) = 1:
The expected payo§ obtained from a given act, with respect to a non-additive belief, i;
can be found using the Choquet integral, deÖned below.
DeÖnition 2.2 The Choquet integral of ui (xi; xi) with respect to capacity i on Xi is:
Vi (xi) = ui
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1The restriction to integer values enables us to apply the equilibrium concept from Eichberger and Kelsey
(2014). It is not essential to require e§ort levels to be integers. It could be any other Önite set of real numbers:
2Of course this convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of subjects in
our experiments.
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Schmeidler (1989) axiomatised preferences which may be represented by maximising a Cho-
quet integral with respect to a capacity. Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) introduced
the neo-additive capacity model, which is a special case of Schmeidlerís theory. In this model,
the decision-maker has beliefs based on an additive probability distribution i: However, these
beliefs are ambiguous. The conÖdence in the belief is represented by (1  i); with i = 1
corresponding to complete ignorance and i = 0 denoting no ambiguity. The decision-makerís
attitude to ambiguity is measured by i: The higher the i; the more ambiguity-averse the
decision-maker will be. These preferences are deÖned as follows.
DeÖnition 2.3 A neo-additive-capacity i on Xi is deÖned by i (Xiji; i; i) = 1;
i (?ji; i; i) = 0 and i (Aji; i; i) = (1 i) i + (1 i) i (A) for ; $ A $ Xi; where
0 6 i < 1, i is an additive probability distribution on Xi; and i(A) =
P
xi2A
i(xi).3
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) show that the Choquet expected value of a
pay-o§ function ui (xi; ) with respect to the neo-additive-capacity i is given by:
Vi (xi) = ii min
xi2xi
ui (xi; xi) + i (1 i) max
xi2Xi
ui (xi; xi) + (1 i)  Eiui (xi; xi) ;
where Ei denotes conventional expectation with respect to the probability distribution i:
This expression is a weighted average of the highest payo§, the lowest payo§ and an average
payo§. The response to ambiguity is partly optimistic represented by the weight given to the
best outcome and partly pessimistic. We deÖne the support of a neo-additive capacity to be
the support of the additive probability on which it is based.4
DeÖnition 2.4 The support of a neo-additive capacity i (Aji; i; i) = ii + (1 i) i (A)
is given by supp i = supp i:
3Where convenient we shall suppress the arguments ;  and  and simply write  (A) : Chateauneuf, Eich-
berger, and Grant (2007) write the neo-additive capacity in the form  (A) = +(1 ) (A) : In the main text
we have modiÖed the deÖnition of a neo-additive capacity to be consistent with the majority of the literature
where  is the weight placed on the minimum expected utility.
4For a justiÖcation of this deÖnition and its relation to other support notions see Eichberger and Kelsey
(2014).
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In games, i is determined endogenously as the prediction of the players from the knowledge
of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat the degrees of
optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as exogenous. DeÖne the best-response correspondence of
player i given that his/her beliefs are represented by a neo-additive capacity i by Ri(i) =
argmaxxi2Xi Vi (xi) :
DeÖnition 2.5 (Equilibrium under Ambiguity) A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 

2)
is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if for i = 1; 2, supp (i )  Ri(i):
Equilibrium strategies are given by the supports of the capacities, which are required to
be best-responses. If these are singleton sets, we have a pure equilibrium. Otherwise we shall
say that an equilibrium is mixed.5 In an EUA each player perceives ambiguity about the
strategy of his/her opponent. This is represented by an ambiguous belief, in the form of a
capacity over the opponentís strategy space. However the support of a playerís beliefs is itself an
ambiguous event. This reáects some uncertainty about whether or not his/her opponents play
best responses. Players respond to this ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by over-weighting
the best outcome and partly in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome. In
this context the best (resp. worst) outcome is oneís opponent playing the most (resp. least)
favourable strategy. Consistency between beliefs and actions is achieved by requiring that all
strategies in the support of a playerís beliefs be a best response for his/her opponent.
A common interpretation of NE is that each player chooses a strategy which maximises
his/her utility given the strategy of the other players. However it is also possible to view NE
as an equilibrium in beliefs. From this viewpoint each player has a subjective belief about
the actions of his/her opponents and chooses a best response to this belief. DeÖnition 2.5
extends the interpretation of NE as an equilibrium in beliefs, by allowing these beliefs to be
5This deÖnition of equilibrium comes from Eichberger and Kelsey (2014). It is based on earlier work by Dow
and Werlang (1994).
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non-additive. We interpret the deviation from additivity as representing ambiguity about the
opponentís strategy choice.
We aim to extend the concept of NE by allowing for possibility that a player may view
his/her opponentsí strategy choice as ambiguous. If we added to DeÖnition 2.5 a requirement
that the capacities 1 and 

2 were additive, it would be an alternative deÖnition of NE. Hence
we believe we have just extended NE to allow for ambiguity.
3 Public Goods Theory
In this section we study the e§ect of ambiguity in the Best-Shot and Weakest-Link public
goods models. We Önd that ambiguity-aversion tends to reduce contributions in the weakest
link model but increases them in the best shot case. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies
are unique if there is su¢cient ambiguity.
3.1 Best Shot
If players are ambiguity-averse, we show that for high levels of ambiguity, both of them will
choose the highest possible strategy. To understand this, recall that in Nash equilibrium, one
player will provide the highest possible e§ort level and the other will free-ride by supplying the
lowest e§ort. However with high ambiguity each player becomes concerned about the worst
scenario, which is his/her opponent supplying low e§ort. This can cause both players to choose
the highest e§ort level. Thus ambiguity encourages the individuals to supply more e§ort. These
e§ort levels would be ine¢ciently high in the corresponding situation without ambiguity. It is
less clear that they are ine¢cient when ambiguity is present, since they do protect the agents
against ex-ante utility losses due to ambiguity-aversion.
If both players are ambiguity-loving, then one may get an equilibrium where each provides
the lowest possible e§ort level. Ambiguity-loving causes a player to over-weight the best out-
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come, which occurs when the opponent chooses the highest e§ort. This over-weighting reduces
the given playerís perceived marginal beneÖt, which results in the choice of the lowest e§ort
level. E§ectively both are attempting to free ride on the e§ort of the other. If one player
is ambiguity-loving and the other is ambiguity-averse then we can get an equilibrium where
the ambiguity averse player uses the highest strategy and the other player uses the lowest
strategy. As above, ambiguity-aversion increases the incentive to choose a high strategy and
ambiguity-loving increases the incentive to play a low strategy.
Finally if ambiguity is low then there are multiple EUAs. In one Player 1 plays the highest
strategy and Player 2 plays the lowest strategy and in the other the roles are reversed. This is
similar to the standard Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that both players are ambiguity averse i.e.  = 1. The pure equilibria
under ambiguity of the Best-Shot game are as follows:
1. if (1 1) + 11 < c and (1 2) + 22 < c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and
are equal to hx; xi :
2. if (1 1) + 11 < c and (1 2) + 22 > c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and
are equal to hx; xi :
3. if (1 1) + 11 > c and (1 2) + 22 < c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and
are equal to hx; xi :
4. if (1 1) + 11 > c > 11 and (1 2) + 22 > c > 22; there are two possible pairs
of equilibrium strategies hx; xi and hx; xi :
5. if 11 < c and 22 > c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are equal to hx; xi :
6. if 11 > c and 22 < c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are equal to hx; xi :
7. if 11 > c and 22 > c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are given by, x1 =
x2 = x:
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Proof. Consider Player 1: Suppose that she believes that Player 2ís e§ort will be ~x2; where
x 6 ~x2 6 x: Then 1ís (Choquet) expected pay-o§ conditional on this belief will be:
V 1 (x1j~x2) =
8>><>>:
1 (1 1) x+ (1 1) ~x2 + (11  c) x1; if x1 < ~x2;
1 (1 1) x+ [(1 1) + 11  c]x1; if x1 > ~x2:
(1)
By similar reasoning the pay-o§ of Player 2 is given by:
V 2 (x2j~x1) =
8>><>>:
2 (1 2) x+ (1 2) ~x1 + (22  c) x2; if x2 < ~x1;
2 (1 2) x+ [(1 2) + 22  c]x2; if x2 > ~x1:
(2)
Part 1 Clearly this implies 11  c < 0: Hence, by equation (1), V 1 (x1j~x2) is a strictly
decreasing function of x1: The only possible best response is x1 = x: Similarly the best response
for Player 2 is x and thus the equilibrium strategies are hx; xi :
Part 2 As in part 1, V 1 (x1j~x2) is a strictly decreasing function of x1 and the only possible
best response is x1 = x: From equation (2) we see that V 2 (x2jx) is increasing in x2: Hence
Player 2ís best response is x and thus the equilibrium strategies are hx; xi :
Part 3 By similar reasoning to that used in part 2, we may show that hx; xi is the unique
equilibrium strategy proÖle.
Part 4 By equation (1), V 1 (x1j~x2) is decreasing for x1 < ~x2 and increasing for x1 > ~x2:
Consequently the only possible best responses are x1 = x or x1 = x: Since Player 2 is in a
similar position if ~x2 is a best response we must have ~x2 = x or ~x2 = x: If ~x2 = x; then
V 1 (x1jx) is decreasing, hence Player 1ís best response is x and thus the equilibrium strategies
are hx; xi : If ~x2 = x; then V 1 (x1jx) is increasing, Player 1ís best response is x and hence the
equilibrium strategies are hx; xi :
Part 5 Note that 22 > c implies (1 2) + 22 > c: From equation (2) we see that
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that V 2 (x2j~x1) is strictly increasing in x2 for all values of ~x1: Hence Player 2ís best response is
x2 = x: By equation (1), V 1 (x1jx) is decreasing in x1: Thus x1 = x is Player 1ís best response.
Consequently the equilibrium strategies are hx; xi and are unique.
Part 6 Follows by similar reasoning to part 5.
Part 7 Then by parts 5 and 6 the best responses of player 1 and 2 are x1 = x and
x2 = x respectively. This holds regardless of the playerís belief about the behaviour of his/her
opponent. Consequently the equilibrium strategies are hx; xi and are unique.
Next we analyse the mixed equilibria in the Best Shot game. We Önd that there is an
interval of values of marginal cost, c; for which a mixed equilibrium exists. However this
interval becomes small as ambiguity, ; increases and eventually disappears in the limit where
 ! 1: The following result states this formally.
Proposition 3.2 The Best Shot Game has a mixed equilibrium in which both players have two
best responses x and x provided, 1 1 (1 1) > c > 11 and 1 2 (1 2) > c > 22:
Proof. We look for a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both x and x are best responses.
Then, by deÖnition, the support of the equilibrium beliefs must be fx; xg : In the neo-additive
model of ambiguity this implies that  (x) =  > 0;  (x) = (1 ) > 0 and  (x) = 0 for
x =2 fx; xg :
Consider Player 1: Her (Choquet) expected utility from playing these strategies are:
V 1 (x) = 1 (1 1) x+ 11x+ (1 1) [x+ (1 ) x] cx;
V 1 (x) = 1 (1 1) x+ 11x+ (1 1) x cx:
For both x and x to be best responses we must have: V 1 (x) = V 1 (x) hence,
(11  c) x+ (1 1) [x+ (1 ) x] = (11  c) x+ (1 1) x:
Thus (11  c) (x x) + (1 1) [(1 ) x (1 ) x] = 0:
Hence (11  c) + (1 1) (1 ) = 0, which implies (1 ) = c1111 :
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For such an equilibrium to exist it is necessary that 1 > 1   > 0: This is equivalent
to 1  1 (1 1) > c > 11: From a similar analysis of Player 2ís choice we need to have
1 2 (1 2) > c > 22:
3.2 Weakest Link
In the weakest link model, provision of the public good is equal to theminimum of the individual
contributions; Cornes and Sandler (1996)). This model is also known as the minimum e§ort
coordination game; Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990). In the absence of ambiguity, any situation
where both players choose the same e§ort level is a NE.
Below we show that if there is su¢cient ambiguity, then equilibrium will be unique. If
players are su¢ciently ambiguity-averse, they will both use the lowest possible strategy. In
contrast, they will choose the highest possible strategy if they are su¢ciently ambiguity-loving.
The intuition is that ambiguity-aversion can cause a given individual to be concerned that
somebody else will make a low contribution. In which case his/her own e§ort will be wasted.
As a result the given individual will make a low contribution. However if all think likewise,
the only equilibrium is where everybody makes the smallest possible contribution. For lower
degrees of ambiguity the EUA is similar to the equilibrium without ambiguity. Coordinating
on any of the possible e§ort levels constitutes an equilibrium.
The following result describes the impact of ambiguity in the weakest link public good model.
As one might expect, increases in ambiguity-aversion make it more likely that a player will
provide the lowest e§ort. If there is a high degree of ambiguity and players are very ambiguity
loving, then it is possible that both will choose the highest possible strategy. However we
believe that this outcome is unlikely to be observed in practice. For low levels of ambiguity
there are multiple EUA. In contrast the equilibrium is unique when ambiguity is high.
Proposition 3.3 Assume that both players have neo-additive preferences. The equilibria under
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ambiguity of the weakest link model are as follows:
1. if either c > 1 11 or c > 1 22; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are equal
to hx; xi;
2. if 1 11 > c > 1 (1 1) and 1  22 > c > 2 (1 2) ; then hx^1; x^2i is a pair of
EUA strategies if and only if x^1 = x^2;
3. if 1 (1 1) > c and 1 22 > c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are equal to
hx; xi;
4. if 1 11 > c and 2 (1 2) > c; the equilibrium strategies are unique and are equal to
hx; xi.
Proof. Consider Player 1: Suppose that she believes that Player 2ís e§ort will be ~x2; where
x 6 ~x2 6 x: Then 1ís (Choquet) expected pay-o§ conditional on this belief will be:
V 1 (x1j~x2) =
8>><>>:
11x+ (1 11  c) x1; if x1 < ~x2;
11x+ (1 1) ~x2 + (1  11  c) x1; if x1 > ~x2:
(3)
Similarly if Player 2 believes that Player 1ís e§ort will be ~x; then 2ís (Choquet) expected pay-o§
will be:
V 2 (x2j~x1) =
8>><>>:
22x+ (1 22  c) x2; if x2 < ~x1;
22x+ (1 2) ~x1 + (2  22  c) x2; if x2 > ~x1:
(4)
Part 1 Clearly 1 11 > 1  11: If c > 1 11 then V 1 is strictly decreasing in x1:
Thus Player 1 has a unique best response, x: Given this, Player 2ís (Choquet) expected pay-o§
is decreasing in x2; hence his best response is x: The proof for the case where c > 1 22 is
similar.
Part 2 Let hx^1; x^2i be a pair of EUA strategies. Suppose, if possible, that x^1 > x^2: Then
by equation (3), V 1 is strictly decreasing in x1 for x1 > x^2: This establishes that x^1 is not a best
12
response, contrary to the original hypothesis. Thus we must have x^1 6 x^2: A similar argument
establishes that x^2 > x^1; which implies that x^2 = x^1:
To prove the converse assume that x0 2 X: We need to show that x01 = x02 = x0 are EUA
strategies. Substituting ~x2 = x02 into equation (3) we Önd that V
1 is increasing in x1 for
x 6 x1 6 x0 and decreasing in x1 for x0 6 x1 6 x: This implies that x1 = x01 is Player 1ís best
response. By similar reasoning x2 = x02 is a best response for Player 2: It follows that hx01; x02i
is a pair of equilibrium strategies.
Part 3 Note that 1 (1 1) > c implies 1 1 > c; hence V 1 is strictly increasing in x1
for any beliefs she has about Player 2: Thus x1 = x is her best response. Given that ~x1 = x; V 2
is strictly increasing in x2; which implies that Player 2ís best response is x2 = x: Hence there
is a unique pair of equilibrium strategies, hx; xi :
Part 4 Follows by similar reasoning to part 3.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In part 1 a given player i, perceives a high degree
of ambiguity and is ambiguity-averse thus ii is close to 1. This causes him to overweight the
possibility that his opponent will supply minimal e§ort. He decides to supply minimal e§ort
since anything more is wasted. His opponent responds by also supplying low e§ort. Parts 3
and 4 describe a situation where one individual perceives a high degree of ambiguity and is
also extremely ambiguity-loving. This causes him/her to choose the highest possible strategy.
His/her opponent chooses the highest possible strategy in response.
Part 2 is similar to the situation without ambiguity, since any situation in which both players
choose the same e§ort level can be an equilibrium. However as ambiguity increases, the range
of parameter values in this case shrinks and eventually it disappears altogether. One may show
in general the equilibrium is unique provided ambiguity is su¢ciently high.
The next result Önds mixed strategy equilibria in the weakest link game. It is similar to the
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corresponding result for the best shot game. There exist mixed strategy equilibria provided the
marginal cost, c, lies in a certain interval. As ambiguity increases this interval becomes shorter
and eventually disappears.
Proposition 3.4 Let ~x and x^ be two strategies such that x^ > ~x; then the Weakest Link Game
has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both ~x and x^ are best responses provided, 1 11 >
c > 1 (1 1) and 1 2 > c > 2 (1 2) :
Proof. We are looking for a mixed equilibrium in which the support of the equilibrium beliefs is
f~x; x^g : In the neo-additive model of ambiguity this implies that  (x^) = ^ > 0;  (~x) = 1^ > 0
and  (x) = 0 for x =2 f~x; x^g :
Consider Player 1; her (Choquet) expected utility from the two strategies is given by:
V 1 (x^) = 1 (1 1) x^+ 11x+ (1 1) (^x^+ (1 ^) ~x) cx^
V 1 (~x) = 1 (1 1) ~x+ 11x+ (1 1) ~x c~x:
If both ~x and x^ are best responses, in equilibrium they have to yield the same expected
utility, which implies [1 (1 1) c] (x^ ~x) + (1 1) ^ (x^ ~x) = 0 thus ^ = c1(11)11 :
For ^ to be a probability we require, 1 > c1(11)
11 > 0; which implies c > 1 (1 1) and
1  1 > c  1 (1 1) thus 1  11 > c: Putting this together, the following inequalities
must be satisÖed in a mixed strategy equilibrium: 1  11 > c > 1 (1 1) : A similar
analysis of Player 2ís choice shows that existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium requires
1 22 > c > 2 (1 2) :
The result applies for any pair of strategies x^ and ~x such that x^ > ~x: Thus if c is in the
speciÖed range there are many mixed strategy equilibria, all of which disappear as ambiguity
increases.
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4 Public Good Experiments
4.1 Experimental Model
In this section we describe our experiments and the predicted behaviour. We aim to test
the hypothesis that ambiguity has opposite e§ects in games of strategic complements and
substitutes; Eichberger and Kelsey (2002).
The task given to the subjects was to choose an e§ort level from the set X = f100; :::; 150g.
The marginal cost of e§ort was kept constant at 50% of the e§ort exerted, i.e., c = 0:5: In
the weakest-link game, the payo§ of the subject would thus be: ui (xi; xi) = minfxi; xig 
0:5xi, where xi denotes the contribution of individual i and c = 0:5 is the marginal cost
of a contribution. In the best-shot scenario, the payo§ of the subject was: ui (xi; xi) =
max fxi; xig  0:5xi. The Önal payo§ matrices (after subtracting costs) for the games can be
seen in Figures 1 and 2:
Figure 1: Two Player Representation of the Best Shot Game
By Proposition 3.3, the NE of the weakest-link game is for both players to coordinate on
any one of the six e§ort levels available, thus f(x1; x2) 2 X j x1 = x2g. As a result, there are
multiple NE. Given this, it is understandable that there would be ambiguity among the subjects
about which e§ort level they should attempt to coordinate on. The equilibrium action with
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Figure 2: Two-Player Representation of the Weakest Link Game
a high level of ambiguity would be for a subject to choose an e§ort level of 100, which gives
him an ambiguity-safe payo§ of 50ECU (See Figure 2); irrespective of his opponentís choice:
Selecting an e§ort level of 100 thus frees the subject from having to depend on his opponentís
choice and/or having to achieve perfect coordination in their chosen e§ort levels.
By Proposition 3.1, the best-shot game has two pure NE: hx1; x2i = h100; 150i and hx1; x2i =
h150; 100i :6 NE predicts that one of the players will exert the highest e§ort level (in our case 150) ;
while the other will free-ride and choose the lowest e§ort available (in our case 100). Here again,
we have multiple NE and it is expected that subjects would perceive ambiguity about which
one to choose. If the level of ambiguity about the opponentís choice is high, the equilibrium
action under ambiguity is to choose the highest e§ort level, i.e., 150; since this provides the
player with a constant payo§ irrespective of the opponentís decision.
By identifying the monetary payments to subjects with utilities we are implicitly assuming
risk neutrality. We believe this is not problematic since the qualitative results only depend on
ordinal properties of the pay-o§s and so would be unchanged if we assumed risk aversion. Risk
aversion would alter the position of the boundaries between the di§erent regimes. However it
would not change the comparative statics of ambiguity or ambiguity-attitude, which was the
6This prediction can be obtained from Proposition 3.1 by setting i = 0; for i = 1; 2:
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issue focused on in the present experiment.
4.2 Experimental Design
The games described above were used in paper-based experiments, conducted at St. Stephenís
College in New Delhi, India, and at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory in
Exeter (FEELE), UK. We recruited undergraduate students from St. Stephenís College and
the University of Exeter as our subjects. All the subjects recruited at St. Stephenís College
were Indian nationals, who (by assumption) had an Indian sociocultural upbringing. While
sending out the invitations to recruit subjects at the University of Exeter, we took particular
care to weed out any foreign students who were Indian. As such, the subjects recruited at
FEELE were non-Indian nationals, who had a completely di§erent sociocultural upbringing.
We expected this di§erence would create ambiguity on the part of Exeter subjects.
The experiments were conducted with three di§erent treatments. In Treatment I, subjects
were matched with locally recruited subjects - this included two experimental sessions where
Indian subjects played other locally recruited Indian subjects, and one session where Exeter
subjects played other Exeter subjects. In Treatment II, Exeter subjects were matched with
subjects from India. The Exeter subjects were informed that they would be matched with an
Indian subject whose responses we had already collected. In Treatment III, subjects were told
that their opponent might either be an Indian subject (whose response we had already collected)
or a subject from Exeter. Subjects were allowed to choose di§erent e§ort levels against the two
opponents.7
Subjects Örst read through a short, comprehensive set of instructions at their own pace,
following which the instructions were also read out to all the participants in general.8 The
7The Örst two sessions (40 subjects) were run in India, where locally recruited Indian subjects played against
each other. The remaining seven sessions (141 subjects) were run in Exeter, where Exeter subjects either played
each other or against the foreign subject.
8Experimental protocols are available on-line at: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-protocols.html.
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subjects were asked to Öll out practice questions to check that they understood the games
correctly. Each subject was then asked to choose one e§ort level for the weakest-link game,
followed by an e§ort level for the best-shot game. In the case of Treatment III, subjects played
the weakest-link and best-shot games once against the local subject and once against the foreign
subject. As such, subjects were asked to make two choices in Treatments I and II and four
choices in Treatment III. Subjects played each game exactly once. We believe that this made
the games e§ectively one-shot, as subjects received no feedback between the rounds and could
not incorporate any learning.
Once subjects had made both decisions, a throw of dice determined one game round for
which they would be paid. Subjects in India were paid a show-up fee of Rs:200 ($2), together
with their earnings from the chosen round, where 100ECU = Rs:200: Exeter subjects were paid
a show-up fee of $3, together with their earnings from the chosen round, where 100ECU = $2:9
We picked one round at random for payment in order to prevent individuals from self-insuring
against payo§ risks across rounds; see Charness and Genicot (2009). If all rounds count equally
towards the Önal payo§, subjects are likely to try and accumulate a high payo§ in the Örst
few rounds and then care less about how they decide in the following rounds. In contrast, if
subjects know that they will be paid for a random round, they treat each decision with care.
Playersí decisions were matched according to a predetermined random matching, and pay-o§s
were announced.
Treatments I and III consisted of 60 subjects each and Treatment II had 61 subjects. In
total there were 181 subjects who took part in the experiment, 81 of whom were males and
the remaining 100 were females. Each experimental session lasted a maximum of 30 minutes
including payment.
9These experiments were conducted in the period of November 2010 - February 2011. The exchange rate at
that point was 1 GBP = 80 INR. The idea was that the average earnings from our experiment which lasted a
maximum of 30 minutes, should be able to a§ord our subjects (university students) the chance to go out for a
meal and a non-alcoholic drink. The purchasing power parity that we were aiming for was a burger meal.
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In our experiments, subjects always made a decision for the weakest-link game followed by
the best-shot game. This order was not varied. According to Harrison, Johnson, McInne, and
Rutstrom (2005), an order e§ect occurs when having participated in one task, a subjectís be-
haviour in subsequent tasks is a§ected by his/her prior experience. In particular, participating
in a low-payment choice before making a high-payment choice, magniÖes the scale of the utility
received/payo§ from the subsequent task. As such, there may be some ìorder-e§ectsî in the
decisions made by our subjects. These order-e§ects can be mitigated if the order in which
subjects see the two decision choices is varied, or if subjects are asked to only make one choice,
i.e., either take part in the weakest-link game or the best-shot game, not both. Moreover, in our
experiments, we do not control for individualís risk aversion as done by Holt and Laury (2002),
who used a menu of ordered lottery choices to elicit risk attitudes under various payment con-
ditions. In future experiments, it may be interesting to elicit an independent risk-attitude of
subjects and check whether there is any correlation to their ambiguity-attitude. However, this
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
5 Data Analysis and Results
Treatment I In this treatment, subjects were matched against other locally recruited subjects
only.10 In the weakest link experiment, we Önd that 22% (13) of the subjects chose an e§ort
level of 100; (See Figure 3): This is the e§ort level at which the subject has a constant payo§,
which is independent of the opponentís action. Moreover, 65% (39) of subjects chose an e§ort
level between 100 and 120, i.e., the lower end of the spectrum of e§ort choices. This conÖrms the
theoretical prediction that ambiguity would lead to subjects reducing their e§ort levels. Some
10This treatment included two experimental sessions where Indian subjects played other locally recruited
Indian subjects, and one session where Exeter subjects played other locally recruited Exeter subjects. Since
subjects always play other locally recruited subjects in this treatment, we have collated the data from the three
sessions, without loss of e¢ciency. For a country-speciÖc breakdown of choices under Treatment I, please see
Appendix Table 4.
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subjects (9); chose the maximum e§ort level, 150; however, they were in a very small minority.
Previous experiments conducted by us, Kelsey and le Roux (2015), have found that a minority
of subjects display ambiguity-seeking behaviour in Ellsberg-urn type decision problems. Thus,
the present experiment conÖrms that similar ambiguity-seeking behaviour is also observed in
games. In the best-shot round, we Önd that 47% (28) of the subjects chose the e§ort level 150
(the equilibrium action under uncertainty): Moreover, ambiguity may be seen as the reason for
subjects increasing their e§ort levels - with 67% (40) of the subjects choosing an e§ort level in
the high range of 130 150.
Figure 3: Crosstable Frequency of E§ort Levels: Weakest Link vs. Best Shot in Treatment I
While analysing the manner in which people switch e§ort levels between the two scenarios,
we Önd that 55% (33) of our subjects switched from a low e§ort level in the weakest-link round,
to a higher e§ort level in the best-shot game (See Table 3). These subjects display ambiguity-
averse behaviour, which is in line with Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). Interestingly, we Önd
that 25% (15) of subjects display a preference for ambiguity, choosing a high e§ort level in the
weakest-link game and then switching to a low e§ort level in the best-shot round. We also note
that 20% (12) of subjects did not change their chosen e§ort levels between the two rounds -
these subjects could be displaying ambiguity neutral behaviour.11
11Alternatively, unchanged e§ort levels might be caused by subjects were trying to be consistent. Another
trivial reason could be that, there are subjects who having chosen an e§ort level in the previous round, do not
want to go to the trouble of thinking again and stick with their previous decision.
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Table 1: Switching E§ort Levels between Weakest Link and Best Shot Game
Treatment I Treatment II
Low E§ort to High E§ort 33 55% 28 46%
High E§ort to Low E§ort 15 25% 20 33%
Constant E§ort Level 12 20% 13 21%P
60 61
Treatment II In this treatment, Exeter subjects were matched with the foreign opponent
only. In the weakest-link round, only 8% (5) of the subjects chose e§ort level 100 (See Figure
4). Even though the constant-payo§ e§ort level has been chosen by a small minority, a sizeable
59% (36) of subjects have chosen low contribution levels in the range 100  120. In the best-
shot game, 43% (26) of the subjects chose an e§ort of 150, which is the equilibrium action
under ambiguity, while 59% (36) of the subjects chose high contribution levels in the range of
130 150. This provides an indication that ambiguity is resulting in e§orts being concentrated
at the lower end of the set of e§orts in the case of the weakest-link game; and at the higher
end, in case of the best-shot game:
Figure 4: Crosstable Frequency of E§ort Levels: Weakest Link vs. Best Shot in Treatment II
Table 1, summarises the manner in which people switch e§ort levels between the two sce-
narios. We Önd that 46% (28) of the subjects who chose a low e§ort level in the weakest-link
experiment switched to a higher e§ort level in the best-shot game. This is compatible with
ambiguity-averse behaviour. Moreover, 33% (20) of subjects display ambiguity-seeking behav-
iour, choosing a high e§ort level in the weakest-link round followed by a lower e§ort level in
the best-shot game, while 21% (13) of subjects do not change their chosen e§ort levels be-
tween the two rounds. It is interesting to note from Table 1, that more subjects displayed
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ambiguity-seeking behaviour when faced by the foreign subject (compared to Treatment I). We
had expected subjects to be more ambiguity-averse/feel more anxious when matched against
the foreign subject, but our data points in the opposite direction.
Treatment III In Treatment III, subjects were told that their opponent might either be an
Indian subject (whose response we had already collected) or a subject from Exeter. Subjects
were allowed to choose di§erent e§ort levels against the two opponents. As such, subjects in
this treatment made four choices, i.e., one, in the weakest-link game against the local subject;
two, in the weakest-link game against the foreign subject; three, in the best-shot game against
the local subject; and four, in the best-shot game against the foreign subject. This was done to
check whether the level of ambiguity perceived by them or their ambiguity-attitude depended
on the type of opponent. Figures 5 and 6; provide a summary of subject behaviour in this
treatment.
Figure 5: Crosstable Frequency of E§ort Levels against Local Subject: Weakest Link vs. Best
Shot in Treatment III
In the weakest-link round, 27% (16) of Exeter subjects chose an e§ort level of 100 against
a local opponent while 28% (17) chose it against the foreign opponent. The di§erence in the
number of people choosing the lowest e§ort level vs. the foreign opponent is very marginal.
On the whole, 58% (35) of the subjects chose a low e§ort level between 100  120, against
the local opponent, while 53% (32) chose an e§ort in that range against the foreign opponent.
We Önd (as in Treatment II) fewer people behaving in an ambiguity-averse manner against the
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foreign subject.
In the best-shot game, we Önd that 40% (24) of the subjects chose the maximum e§ort 150
against the local opponent, while 43% (26) chose it against the foreign opponent. Moreover,
55% (33) and 57% (34) of subjects chose in the high e§ort range of 130  150, against the
local and foreign opponents respectively. We Önd that 28% (17) and 35% (21) of subjects
chose e§ort level 100 against the local and foreign opponents respectively, in the hope of free-
riding. Intuitively, these subjects are over-weighting the probability of a good outcome (that
their opponent has chosen e§ort level = 150), and are thus displaying an optimistic attitude
to ambiguity. Again, it can be noted that more subjects are displaying this optimistic attitude
toward uncertainty against the foreign opponent!
Even though we do not see a huge disparity in the e§ort choices versus the local and foreign
opponent, ambiguity does explain (most of) the deviations from Nash equilibrium. In the
case of the weakest link game, most responses are concentrated towards the lower end of the
spectrum between 100  120; while in the best shot case, responses are concentrated towards
the high end, i.e., at 150.
Figure 6: Crosstable Frequency of E§ort Levels against Foreign Subject: Weakest Link vs. Best
Shot in Treatment III
We ran McNemarís test to check whether subjects responded to ambiguity in a pessimistic
way. The null hypothesis was that the probability of choosing a low e§ort in the weakest-
link round, followed by a high e§ort in the best-shot round (henceforth, labelled ambiguity-
averse behaviour/decision), equalled the probability of choosing a high e§ort in the weakest-
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link round, followed by a low e§ort in the best-shot round (henceforth, labelled ambiguity-
seeking behaviour/decision). The alternative was that the number of ambiguity-averse decisions
was not equal to the number of ambiguity-seeking decisions (in particular, the ambiguity-
averse decisions > the ambiguity-seeking decisions). The statistical data follows a chi-squared
distribution with one degree of freedom. When looking at the data as a whole (all three
treatments/nine sessions), we reject the null at a 1% level of signiÖcance. The number of
ambiguity-averse decisions made, on the whole, was twice the number of ambiguity-seeking
decisions (See Table 2). When looking at the di§erent treatments individually, we reject the
null at a 1% level of signiÖcance for Treatment I, and at a 5% level of signiÖcance for Treatment
II. We fail to reject the null for Treatment III, for decisions against both the local subject and
the foreign subject. The McNemar Test thus demonstrates that on the whole, there was a
di§erence between the number of ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking choices made.
Table 2: Summary of Decision Choices
W-L Low E§ort,
B-S High E§ort
(Ambiguity-averse)
W-L Low E§ort,
B-S Low E§ort
W-L High E§ort,
B-S High E§ort
W-L High E§ort,
B-S Low E§ort
(Ambiguity-seeking)
T I 25 13 15 7
T II 21 15 15 10
T III LS 20 15 11 14
T III FS 18 14 17 11
Total 84 57 58 42
In order to investigate further, whether the number of ambiguity-averse decisions exceeded
the number of ambiguity-seeking decisions, we ran a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. The null
hypothesis was that the number of ambiguity-averse decisions made equalled the number of
ambiguity-seeking decisions; while the alternative was that ambiguity-averse behaviour ex-
ceeded ambiguity-seeking behaviour. We ranked behaviour in all the di§erent sessions, and
found that we could reject the null at a 1% level of signiÖcance. Furthermore, if we consider
a more simple sign test, with the same null and alternative as before, we Önd that we can
reject the null at a 5% signiÖcance level: Thus, we Önd that subjects showed ambiguity-averse
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behaviour signiÖcantly more often in our experiments, than ambiguity-seeking behaviour.
6 Related Literature
This section reviews previous experimental studies of related games. Typically the authors have
found results which appear paradoxical when viewed from the perspective of Nash equilibrium.
We believe that many of these apparent paradoxes can be resolved by using the notion of
equilibrium with ambiguity.
Experiments on the weakest-link game were previously studied by Huyck, Battalio, and
Beil (1990). They study tacit coordination in this game, and conclude that it is unlikely
that a payo§-dominant equilibrium would be chosen in a one-shot game or in repeated play.
Moreover, they Önd that when there are a large number of players attempting to coordinate,
the equilibrium is secure but ine¢cient. Our results in the weakest-link round are consistent
with their conclusions. We Önd that 59% (142) of subjects chose an e§ort level in the range
100  120, which would result in a payo§-dominated equilibrium. Furthermore, even though
our game consisted of only two subjects coordinating (and not a large number of players), we
found that 21% (51) of subjects chose an e§ort level of 100, which would have resulted in a
secure but ine¢cient equilibrium.
Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), compare contributions to a public good in a sealed bid as
well as a sequential game. They use a repeated game scenario which implements all three possi-
ble versions of the game - standard summation, weakest-link and best-shot, in order to ascertain
which of the three formats results in the greatest free-riding. They Önd that both sealed bid as
well as the sequential game treatments, conÖrmed their hypothesis that the under-provision of
the public good expected under the standard format, is mitigated under the weakest-link for-
mat, but aggravated under the best-shot version. In contrast we found that 55% (33) and 46%
(28) of subjects in Treatment I and II switched from a low e§ort level in the weakest-link round
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to a higher e§ort level in the best-shot game (See Table 1). This may be because the one-shot
nature of our games increases ambiguity and prompts players to increase contributions.
Goeree and Holt (2001) (henceforth GH) study, a set of games which initially conform to
Nash predictions when tested experimentally. However, they show that in each case a change
in a parameter, which is not relevant according to Nash equilibrium leads to a large change in
observed behaviour and failure of Nash predictions. In particular, they study the weakest link
model where subjects could choose an e§ort from the set E = f110; :::; 170g at a marginal cost
of either c = 0:1 or c = 0:9: Recall that in Nash equilibrium subjects coordinate on the same
e§ort level f(e1; e2) 2 E2 j e1 = e2g : GH Önd that for low marginal costs (c = 0:1), subjects
choose high e§ort levels and for high marginal costs (c = 0:9) ; a majority of subjects choose
low e§ort levels. They conclude that this concentration of choices at the lower (resp. higher)
end of the e§ort spectrum is caused by the high (resp. low) marginal cost of e§ort. Eichberger
and Kelsey (2011) argue that GHís results can be explained by ambiguity.
In our experiment we chose a value of marginal cost, (c = 0:5), between the two values
used by GH. We Önd that an intermediate proportion of subjects (22%) choose the lowest
e§ort level. We Önd that subjectsí e§ort choices depend on the e§ect of ambiguity, given the
strategic nature of the game being played. This can be seen in Table 1, where even though the
marginal cost of the e§ort is constant at c = 0:5; subjects switch their e§ort levels depending
on whether it is the weakest-link or the best-shot game being played.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model of the e§ect of ambiguity in the best-
shot and weakest-link models of public good provision. We then proceeded to test the theory
experimentally. Subject behaviour was found to be consistent with our hypothesis. We Önd
that in the presence of ambiguity, subjects choose low e§ort levels in the weakest-link game
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and high e§ort levels in the best-shot game. Moreover, we Önd that on average, 51% (61) of
the subjects who took part in Treatments I and II, display ambiguity-averse behaviour; 29%
(35) of subjects display ambiguity-seeking behaviour; and 20% (25) of subjects do not change
their chosen e§ort levels between the two rounds.12
We expected the subjects to display a greater level of ambiguity-averse behaviour when
faced by a foreign opponent. However, although we observe ambiguity-averse behaviour on the
whole, we Önd a signiÖcant minority of subjects who display an optimistic attitude towards
ambiguity. This is quite a curious Önding, as one would expect that the ambiguity-safe option
would be chosen more often against the foreign subject. Our Öndings contrast with those of
Kilka and Weber (2001), who found that subjects are more ambiguity-averse when the returns
of an investment are dependent on the performance of foreign securities than when they are
linked to domestic securities.
There may be several other reasons that might explain why the level of ambiguity when
facing a foreign subject may remain unchanged. One may be that the subjects wanted to be
consistent in their choices. If this was the case, they would put extra e§ort into choosing the
same action against both opponents. In addition, the returns of a bank depend in a complex
way on Önancial markets and hence present a more di¢cult decision problem than Önding
the right strategy in a game with a relatively small strategy space. This may explain part
of the heightened ìambiguityî captured by Kilka and Weber (2001), where the subjects were
presented with the option of an investment dependent on foreign securities. It is easier for
subjects to conceptualise another person whom they may be faced with, than investments in
known/unknown Önancial markets. It may be interesting to run a follow-up experiment, where
subjects are given the choice of either facing a foreign opponent or investing in a foreign security.
Moreover, the missing e§ect in Treatment II may be attributed to the closeness of UK
12Ambiguity-averse (resp. ambiguity-seeking) behaviour was displayed by subjects who chose a low (resp.
high) e§ort level in the weakest link game followed by a higher (resp. lower) e§ort level in the best shot game.
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and India that developed over the years of India being a British Colony, Indian immigrants
coming to the UK and Indian food becoming national British dishes... Perhaps using students
as subjects might be ambiguity diminishing - as subjects viewed the foreign student as akin to
any other local student. This is not that di¢cult to understand. Globalisation and increased
media awareness, together with the spreading tentacles of social networking and escalating
international student numbers, have ensured that a foreign subject (in this case from India) is
not an unknown quantity any more. There are not many parts of the world, that hold the kind
of ambiguity for us today, as there were in the past.
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A Appendix
Table 3: Decision Choices by Session
Treatment Notional Session
Ambiguity-Averse
Decisions
Ambiguity-Seeking
Decisions
T1 1 8 2
T1 2 9 2
T1 3 8 3
T2 4 4 5
T2 5 11 3
T2 6 6 2
T3 LS 7 9 3
T3 LS 8 3 6
T3 LS 9 8 5
T3 FS 10 7 2
T3 FS 11 5 5
T3 FS 12 6 4
Table 4: Country SpeciÖc Decision Choices in Treatment I
Treatment I
India
(2 sessions)
India
(Avg.)
Exeter
(1 session)
E§ort W-L B-S W-L B-S W-L B-S
100 10 8 5 4 3 4
110 3 2 1:5 1 1 1
120 16 5 8 2:5 6 0
130 6 5 3 2:5 4 3
140 1 2 0:5 1 1 2
150 4 18 2 9 5 10P
40 40 20 20 20 20
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